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Abstract
Theories from psychology suggest that voters perceptions of political
positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candi-
dates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidates
position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called
projection. If votersperceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based
on perceived policy positions then projection gives a generally liked candi-
date an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we construct and analyze
a formal model to investigate under which conditions this incentive survives
in the strategic setting of electoral competition, even if voters dislike ambi-
guity per se.
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1 Introduction
According to theories from psychology (see e.g. Granberg (1993), Krosnick (2002),
and references therein) people prefer to be in a state of cognitive consistency.
Therefore a voter prefers to believe that he agrees with political candidates he likes
(for non-policy related reasons) and disagrees with candidates he dislikes. One way
the voter can achieve this is by distorting his perceptions of the candidatespolicy
positions. He "pulls" the positions of liked candidates towards his own position and
"pushes" the positions of disliked candidates away from it. In general this is called
projection. More specically, positive projection ("pulling") is called assimilation
and negative projection ("pushing") is called contrast.
If we assume that voters cannot have counterfactual perceptions then projection
of a candidates policy position can only happen when the candidate is ambiguous.
So if projection e¤ects exist and voters vote based on perceived policy positions
then a generally liked candidate has an incentive to be ambiguous because of
assimilation. This paper investigates under which conditions this incentive survives
in the strategic setting of electoral competition.
We formulate and analyze an extension of the standard Downsian model that
allows candidates to take ambiguous policy positions and introduces projection
e¤ects in votersperceptions of such positions. Ambiguous positions are modelled
by intervals of policies. Each voter has an (exogenous) positive, neutral or neg-
ative non-policy related attitude towards each candidate. When we say that a
voter likes (dislikes) a candidate it simply means that he has a positive (negative)
attitude towards him. Votersperceptions of announced ambiguous positions are
represented by probability distributions. They use perceived expected utility to
decide on who to vote for. By assuming that voters are risk averse we get that
they dislike ambiguity per se, i.e. if there were no projection e¤ects. Thus any
result predicting ambiguity is driven only by projection (assimilation).
Our rst results answer the following question: Under which conditions can a
candidate defeat the median by being ambiguous, i.e. win the election by taking
an ambiguous position when the other candidates position is xed at the median?
Loosely speaking, we show that if a candidate is liked by some voters and not
disliked by too many then he can defeat the median. For example, a candidate who
is not disliked by any voters can defeat the median if he is liked by an arbitrarily
small group of voters.
Secondly, we consider the question of existence or non-existence of winning
strategies (which must be ambiguous) for a candidate with an advantage due to
voter attitudes and projection. Consider an advantaged candidate who is not
disliked by any voters and liked by a majority and a disadvantaged candidate
who is not liked by any voters. We show that the advantaged candidate has
winning strategies if the assimilation e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong. So our model does
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predict ambiguity in equilibrium when projection is strong. When projection is not
su¢ ciently strong then the advantaged candidate does not have winning strategies
and the model does not have an equilibrium (not even in mixed strategies). So the
advantaged candidate may not be able to win the election for sure, it depends on
the strength of the assimilation e¤ect.
There is a large empirical literature on projection (see Granberg (1993) and
Krosnick (2002) for surveys). A lot of studies using cross-sectional data do pro-
duce evidence that is consistent with projection e¤ects. Krosnick (2002), however,
points out that usually it is also consistent with alternative hypotheses, most
notably policy based evaluation and persuation. A fairly recent study using cross-
sectional data is Merrill, Grofman and Adams (2001). Their ndings are consistent
with projection, but they also show that most of their evidence could be explained
by policy based evaluation (together with di¤erent interpretations of issue scales
among voters). Krosnick (2002) reviews a few panel data studies that carefully
seek to separate projection from policy based evaluation and persuation. They
do not nd compelling evidence of projection. He concludes that the existence of
projection has not yet been convincingly demonstrated and that further empirical
research is needed.
As mentioned above, we make the assumption that projection of political po-
sitions is based on exogenous non-policy related attitudes and that the voting
decision is policy based (given perceptions of positions). Thus we have a combina-
tion of projection and policy based evaluation and it seems hard to cast any verdict
on its validity given the existing empirical literature on projection. Furthermore,
the type of projection we consider is actually quite modest because we rule out
counterfactual perceptions. So unless a candidate is very ambiguous votersper-
ceptions of his position will not be too inaccurate. Therefore our model can still
be relevant even if votersperceptions are reasonably accurate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of related liter-
ature. In Section 3 we set up the model and present some examples of our general
model of projection of ambiguous policy positions. Section 4 contains our results
(all proofs are delegated to the Appendix). In Section 5 we discuss and conlude.
2 Related Literature
A number of theoretical models of ambiguity in electoral competition exist in the
literature. Zeckhauser (1969) and Fishburn (1972) both consider lotteries in social
choice with a discrete set of alternatives (Zeckhauser only considers sets with three
alternatives). They show that a lottery can never be a Condorcet winner.
Shepsle (1972) extends the standard Downsian model by forcing one of the
candidates (the challenger) to take a lottery position, i.e. a non-degenerate proba-
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bility distribution over positions. The voters are expected utility maximizers. The
main result is that if a majority of voters are risk loving on an interval containing
the median, then the challenger can beat an incumbent at the median by taking
a lottery position with mean equal to the median. However, both existence and
non-existence of a winning position for the challenger can occur.
Page (1976) is critical of Shepsles theory of ambiguity. He notes that the
prediction of ambiguity is not very strong because the challenger may not have
a winning strategy. Also he questions whether (a majority of) voters are really
risk loving. Furthermore he argues that lottery positions are not a good way of
modelling ambiguous political positions because candidates do not express their
positions in ways that can easily be perceived as objective probability distribu-
tions. Page also presents his own theory of political ambiguity called emphasis
allocation theory. He considers a multidimensional space of policy and valence
dimensions. Candidates choose which dimensions (issues) to emphasize and take
positions in these dimensions. They are vague/ambiguous on issues they do not
put any emphasis on. Voters evaluate a candidate by summing the utilities of the
candidates positions on the issues, weigthed by the candidates emphasis on each
issue. In an example it is shown that this leads to emphasis on consensus issues
and ambiguity on issues of conict, no matter what the risk preferences of the
voters are. In a footnote Page mentions that a possible di¤erent explanation of
ambiguity could be that it allows for projection (p. 748).
McKelvey (1980) generalizes the results of Zeckhauser (1969) and Fishburn
(1972) to continuous densities on Rn. Furthermore he looks at the e¤ect of in-
troducing exogenous non-zero levels of ambiguity in a special case of electoral
competition. He shows that it does not disrupt existing equilibria.
Glazer (1990) shows by some examples that risk loving voters are not necessary
to get ambiguity in equilibrium in a two candidate electoral game. If there is
uncertainty about the preferred policy of the candidates and the position of the
median voter then ambiguity (not specifying a position) can be the equilibrium
outcome of a model with simultaneous announcements. In a model with sequential
announcements there can be ambiguity in equilibrium because the rst mover does
not want to make the second mover more informed about the position of the median
voter.
Alesina and Cukierman (1990) considers a two period model. In the rst period
an incumbent decides on a policy. Before the second period elections are held and in
the second period the winner enacts his preferred policy (nal period play). Voters
are imperfectly informed about the incumbents preferred policy so they vote using
an estimate based on the rst period policy. Therefore the incumbent can have
an incentive to blur his policy preferences by being ambiguous, i.e. by choosing a
noisy policy instrument. For a non-empty set of parameter values (including risk
averse voters) it is optimal for the incumbent to choose a non-minimal level of
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ambiguity.
Aragones and Neeman (2000) analyze a two stage electoral game with two can-
didates. First the candidates simultaneously choose a point in the policy space
(an ideology) and the choices become common knowledge. Then they simultane-
ously choose their level of ambiguity. Candidates have a preference for winning
and for being ambiguous because it leaves them with more exibility in o¢ ce.
Voters dislike ambiguity so candidates face a trade o¤ between a high probability
of winning (there is uncertainty about the position of the median voter) and being
ambiguous. The main result is that when having exibility in o¢ ce is su¢ ciently
important then there is policy divergence with a non-minimal level of ambiguity
for both candidates. Otherwise there is policy convergence and no ambiguity.
In Aragones and Postlewaite (2002) a model with only three alternative policies
and o¢ ce motivated politicians is considered. Ambiguous positions are modelled
as probability distributions on the set of alternatives. It is known from Fishburn
(1972) that if candidates are not restricted in their choice of distributions then any
equilibrium will consist of degenerate distributions. But Aragones and Postlewaite
restrict the candidates such that each of them must put a minimum of probability
mass on one of the alternatives - the alternative that voters think is most likely
chosen by the candidate after the election. Under that assumption the result of
Fishburn is not valid anymore. The most clean result is found when candidates
are uncertain about the level of intensity of the voters preferences (then candidates
payo¤s are continuous). In that case it holds that (under some further assump-
tions) there always exists a pure strategy equilibrium and in any such equilibrium
candidates are ambiguous (distributions are non-degenerate).
Meirowitz (2005) models a US presidential election with primaries. Each can-
didate can choose to announce a policy in the primaries or to be ambiguous in
the primaries and not announce a policy until the general election. Candidates
must stick to their policy announcements and they are imperfectly informed about
voter preferences. In equilibrium candidates choose not to announce a policies in
the primaries because it enables them to learn more about the electorate before
committing to a policy position and because a candidate announcing a position in
the primaries will be more vulnerable to an unconstrained opponent in the general
election.
Our model is also related to the theoretical literature on valence advantage/can-
didate quality (see e.g. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001) and
Aragones and Palfrey (2002, 2005)). In these models one candidate has an ad-
vantage which makes all voters prefer him over the other candidate if there is
policy convergence. In our model a candidate can have an advantage due to vot-
ersattitudes. But he can only make use of that advantage by being ambiguous
which makes voters who like him assimilate his position. Votersattitudes does
not directly inuence their voting behavior.
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3 The Model
Our starting point is a standard one-dimensional spatial model with two candi-
dates. We will extend that model by allowing candidates to take ambiguous policy
positions and by introducing projection e¤ects in votersperceptions of such posi-
tions. In the following we describe the model in detail.
3.1 The Candidates
Before the election the two candidates announce policy positions. Each candidate
can announce either a certain position or an ambiguous position. A certain po-
sition is represented by a point in the policy space R. An ambiguous position is
represented by a compact interval of policies. Thus the strategy space for each
candidate can be written as
S = f[A  a;A+ a]jA 2 R; a  0g:
Announced positions are credible in the sense that the winning candidate must
enact a policy in his announced interval. So certain positions are credible in the
usual sense.
Each candidates only objective is to win the election, none of them care about
policy. Formally the preference relation of each candidate over the outcome of the
election is given by
win  tie  loose:
Finally we assume that the candidates are fully informed about the electorate and
that this is common knowledge.
3.2 The Electorate
There is a continuum of voters and each of them has a preferred point in the policy
space R. The distribution of preferred points is given by a density function v. We
assume that v is continuous and that the support of v is an interval (bounded
or unbounded). Without loss of generality we assume that the median voter is
located at x = 0, i.e. Z 0
 1
v(x)dx =
Z 1
0
v(x)dx =
1
2
:
Each voter has a utility function on the policy space. Let the utility function of
the median voter be u0 : R ! R. Then the utility function ux0 of a voter with
preferred point at x0 is dened by
ux0(x) = u0(x  x0) for all x 2 R:
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We assume that u0 is symmetric around 0, continuous on R and twice continuously
di¤erentiable on R n f0g with
u00(x) ? 0 for x 7 0;
u000(x) < 0 for x 6= 0:
Thus all voters are strictly risk averse.
We will now model how voters decide on which candidate to vote for. If each
candidate announces a certain position then each voter simply votes for the can-
didate announcing the position with the highest utility. If at least one of the
candidates announces an ambiguous position then it is less obvious how the voters
should decide on who to vote for. We want them to use expected utility. But that
is not straightforward since an ambiguous position is represented by an interval
of policies rather than a probability distribution over policies. For a voter to use
expected utility to evaluate an ambiguous position he has to somehow associate
a probability distribution with the interval representing the position. The distri-
bution represents the voters perception of the ambiguous position. Or, to put it
di¤erently, the voters belief about which policy the candidate will enact if elected.
How voters perceive ambiguous positions is a crucial element of our model and we
will use the rest of this section to describe it.
As mentioned in the introduction, the main idea is that a voters perception of
an ambiguous position depends on whether he has a positive, negative or neutral
(non-policy related) attitude towards the candidate announcing it. If the voter
likes the candidate, i.e. has a positive attitude towards him, then he will put
most of the probability mass on the points of the interval that are closest to
his preferred policy (assimilation). If the voter dislikes the candidate then he
will do the opposite (contrast). And if the voter neither likes nor dislikes the
candidate then he will spread the probability mass evenly across the interval. We
will formalize this below.
For all voters the neutral perception of an ambiguous position is given by
the uniform distribution on the interval. So the perceived expected utility of the
ambiguous position [A  a;A+ a] for a neutral voter with preferred point x0 is
1
2a
Z A+a
A a
ux0(x)dx:
Since voters are strictly risk averse it follows that neutral voters dislike ambiguity.
To model assimilation perceptions rst consider a voter with preferred point
x0  1 and a positive attitude towards a candidate announcing [ 1; 1]. Thus
we are modelling assimilation from the right of an ambiguous position centered
at the median. The probability distribution that the voter associates with the
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ambiguous position is given by some cumulative distribution function F 11 . So the
voters perceived expected utility of the candidates position isZ 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
1
1 (x):
We assume that F 11 satises the following two conditions. U[ 1;1] denotes the
cumulative distribution function of the uniform distribution on [ 1; 1].
 F 11 puts no probability mass outside [ 1; 1] , i.e.
F 11 (x) = 0 for all x <  1 and F 11 (1) = 1:
 F 11 strictly rst order stochastically dominates the uniform distribution on
[ 1; 1], i.e.
F 11 (x)  U[ 1;1](x) for all x 2 R
(with " < " for some x):
The rst condition says that there is no "counterfactual perception". Since the
winning candidate must enact a policy in his announced interval the voter does not
put any probability mass on policies outside the interval. The second condition
is a convenient mathematical way of saying that the voter is assimilating the
candidates position from the right. It means that, for any x 2 [ 1; 1], F 11 puts at
least as much probability mass to the right of x as the uniform distribution does
(and strictly more for some x). Thus we see that, relative to the neutral perception
given by the uniform distribution, the voter "pulls" probability mass to the right,
i.e. towards his own preferred position.
We model assimilation of [ 1; 1] from the left by symmetry. Therefore the
assimilation perception for a voter with preferred point x0   1 is given by the
distribution function F 11 dened by
F 11 (x) = 1  lim
y!( x) 
F 11 (y) for all x 2 R:
Because with this denition we have that, for any x 2 [ 1; 1], F 11 puts exactly as
much probability mass on [ 1; x] as F 11 puts on [ x; 1].
Then consider assimilation of [ 1; 1] by some "interior voter", i.e. a voter with
preferred point x0 2 ( 1; 1). The distribution function representing the perception
of such a voter is denoted F x01 . Again we assume that
F x01 (x) = 0 for all x <  1 and F x01 (1) = 1
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to rule out counterfactual perception. Formalizing the pulling of probability mass
towards x0 is a bit more tricky in this case than it was for "exterior voters", but
the idea is the same. We want the distribution function to put more probability
mass on points close to x0 than the uniform distribution does. More precisely we
assume that, for any x > 0, F x01 puts at least as much probability mass on the
interval (x0   x; x0 + x) as the uniform distribution does (and strictly more for
some x). This can be written formally as
lim
y!x 
F x01 (x0 + y)  F x01 (x0   x)  U[ 1;1](x0 + x)  U[ 1;1](x0   x) for all x > 0
(with " > " for some x).
To have symmetry of perceptions we assume that, for any x0 2 ( 1; 1),
F x01 (x) = 1  lim
y!( x) 
F x01 (y) for all x 2 R:
Thus we are done modelling how voters assimilate the ambiguous position
[ 1; 1]. Now we will extend the model to cover assimilation of all ambiguous
strategies.
First consider assimilation of [ a; a] for some a > 0. In this case we use a
simple scaling of the distribution functions dening assimilation of [ 1; 1]. More
specically the assimilation perceptions of voters with x0  0 are dened as follows
(assuming symmetry this is all we need).
 For a voter with x0  a the distribution function is denoted F aa . It is dened
by
F aa (x) = F
1
1 (
x
a
) for all x 2 R:
 For a voter with 0  x0 < a the distribution function is denoted F x0a . It is
dened by
F x0a (x) = F
x0
a
1 (
x
a
) for all x 2 R:
It is easily seen that these distribution functions satisfy conditions that are analo-
gous to the ones we imposed on the F x01 s. Counterfactual perception is ruled out
because we have, for any 0  x0  a,
F x0a (x) = 0 for all x <  a and F x0a (a) = 1:
And the F x0a s are assimilation perceptions because
F aa (x)  U[ a;a](x) for all x 2 R
(with " < " for some x)
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and, for any 0  x0 < a,
lim
y!x 
F x0a (x0 + y)  F x0a (x0   x)  U[ a;a](x0 + x)  U[ a;a](x0   x) for all x > 0
(with " > " for some x).
Finally we will dene assimilation of intervals of the type [A  a;A+ a] where
A 6= 0. In that case we simply translate the distribution functions dening assim-
ilation of [ a; a] by the constant A. For example, the assimilation perception of
[A   a;A + a] by a voter with x0  A + a is given by the density function FA+aA;a
dened by
FA+aA;a (x) = F
a
a (x  A):
Obviously the translated distribution functions satisfy the "translated" versions of
the conditions satised by the F x0a s.
Contrast perceptions are dened analogously to the way we have just dened
assimilation perceptions. So, for example, the distribution function representing
the contrast perception of voters to the right of some interval is strictly rst order
stochastically dominated by the uniform distribution on the interval. We use the
same notation for contrast perceptions as for assimilation perceptions except that
we replace the Fs by Gs. So the distribution functions representing contrast
perception of [ 1; 1] by voters to the right of the interval is denoted G11 and so on.
For simplicity we assume that voters with the same preferred policy have the
same attitude towards each candidate. Therefore we can dene the attitude func-
tions Li, i = 1; 2, by
Li(x) =
8<:
1 if voters at x have a positive attitude towards Candidate i
0 if voters at x have a neutral attitude towards Candidate i
 1 if voters at x have a negative attitude towards Candidate i
9=; :
We make the technical assumption that, for each i = 1; 2, the sets L 1i (f1g),
L 1i (f0g) and L 1i (f 1g) are Lebesgue measurable (such that we can integrate
over them). Then the fraction of voters that have a positive/neutral/negative
towards Candidate i isZ
L 1i (f1g)
v(x)dx =
Z
L 1i (f0g)
v(x)dx =
Z
L 1i (f 1g)
v(x)dx:
Before we move on we will give some examples of our model of assimilation.
We will get back to these examples later on.
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3.2.1 Example 1
In our rst example, the assimilation of [ 1; 1] by voters to the right is given by
the distribution function F 11 dened by
F 11 (x) =
(
1 
2
x+ 1 
2
if x 2 [ 1; 1)
1 if x = 1
)
;
where 0 <  < 1 is a parameter. This corresponds to a voter to the right believing
that with probability  the policy will be x = 1 (the policy in the interval closest
to his preferred point) and with probability 1    the policy will be drawn from
the uniform distribution on [ 1; 1].
We want a voter with preferred point x0 2 ( 1; 1) to have the same type of
perception, i.e. to believe that with probability  the policy will be x = x0 and
with probability 1   the policy will be drawn from the uniform distribution. The
distribution function corresponding to this perception is
F x01 (x) =
(
1 
2
x  1 
2
if x 2 [ 1; x0)
1 
2
x+ 1+
2
if x 2 [x0; 1]
)
:
It is easily seen that these distribution functions satisfy the required conditions.
The example is extended to cover assimilation of all ambiguous positions as de-
scribed above (by symmetry, scaling and translation).
3.2.2 Example 2
In our second example, the assimilation of [ 1; 1] by voters to the right is given
by the density function f 11 dened by
f 11 (x) =
(
1 
2
if x 2 [ 1; 0)
1+
2
if x 2 [0; 1]
)
;
where 0 <   1 is a parameter.
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f 11 for some 0 <  < 1.
We see how a voter to the right of the interval "pulls" probability mass towards his
own preferred point. And we see that he does so without putting any probability
mass on points outside the interval.
It is easily seen that the distribution function corresponding to the density
function above is
F 11 (x) =
(
1 
2
x+ 1 
2
if x 2 [ 1; 0)
1+
2
x+ 1 
2
if x 2 [0; 1]
)
:
And then it is straightforward to show that the distribution strictly rst order
stochastically dominates the uniform distribution on [ 1; 1].
The assimilation of [ 1; 1] by voters with x0 2 [0; 1) is given by the density
functions fx01 , x0 2 [0; 1), dened by
fx01 = f
1
1 if
1
2
 x0 < 1
and
fx01 (x) =
(
1 
2
if jx0   xj > 12
1+
2
if jx0   xj  12
)
if 0  x0 < 1
2
:
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fx01 for some x0 2 (0; 12), 0 <  < 1.
Given our denition of assimilation for "exterior voters" this is a natural way of
dening it for "interior voters". In each case a voter puts a constant probability
density of 1+
2
on the half of the interval that is closest to his preferred point and
a constant probability density of 1 
2
on the rest.
It is straightforward to check that the distribution functions given by the fx01 s
satisfy the required conditions. As with our rst example it is extended to cover
assimilation of all ambiguous positions as described above.
4 Results
In this section we will address the questions in the list below. Our answers will
help us understand how and why our introduction of ambiguous positions and
projection e¤ects changes the predictions of the standard model.
1. Under which conditions does the median voter theorem break down because
candidates can take advantage of the assimilation e¤ect by being ambigu-
ous? More specically, when can a candidate win the election by taking
an ambiguous position when the other candidates position is xed at the
median?
2. Under which conditions does a candidate with an advantage due to voters
non-policy related attitudes have a winning strategy? I.e. when does such
a candidate have an ambiguous position that wins the election for him no
matter what position the other candidate takes?
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3. What can we say about existence and properties of Nash equilibria?
All proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
4.1 Defeating the Median
Our rst result shows that a candidate who is liked by a strict majority of voters
can defeat the median, i.e. win the election when the other candidates position is
xed at the median. Furthermore it shows that he can do so by being ambiguous
around the median. Note that no additional assumptions on voter utility functions
or voter perceptions are needed. The result holds even if voters are very risk averse
and the assimilation e¤ect is very small.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose Candidate i is liked by a strict majority of voters, i.e.Z
L 1i (f1g)
v(x)dx >
1
2
:
Then there exists some a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0, Candidate i defeats
the median by announcing the ambiguous position [ a; a]:
Being liked by a strict majority of voters is a necessary condition for a candidate
to be able to defeat the median by an ambiguous position of the type [ a; a],
a > 0. That follows immediately from the assumption that all voters are strictly
risk averse. However, the following result shows that a candidate who is liked by
less than a majority may be able to defeat the median by taking an ambiguous
position that is not centrered at the median. The sets X+i and X
 
i , i = 1; 2, are
dened by
X+i = fx  0jLi(x) = 0g [ fxjLi(x) = 1g
and
X i = fx  0jLi(x) = 0g [ fxjLi(x) = 1g:
We let E11 denote the expected value of F
1
1 .
Theorem 4.2 Suppose X+i contains the preferred points of a strict majority of
voters, i.e. Z
X+i
v(x)dx >
1
2
:
Let A 2 (0; E11). Then there exists some a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0,
Candidate i defeats the median by announcing the ambiguous position
[aA  a; aA+ a]:
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By symmetry it follows that if a strict majority of voters have preferred points
in X i and we let A 2 ( E11 ; 0) then the same conlusion hold. Thus we see that a
candidate who is liked by just a few voters may be able to defeat the median. For
example that is the case if the candidate is not disliked by any voters.
The last result in this section shows that if neither X+i nor X
 
i contains the
preferred points of a strict majority of voters then there exist voter perceptions
(given by F x01 and G
x0
1 , x0 2 [ 1; 1]) such that Candidate i cannot defeat the
median. Thus we have a necessary and su¢ cient condition for Candidate i to be
able to defeat the median for any type of voter perceptions.
Theorem 4.3 Suppose that neither X+i nor X
 
i contains the preferred points of a
strict majority of voters, i.e.Z
X+i
v(x)dx  1
2
and
Z
X i
v(x)dx  1
2
:
Then there exist F x01 and G
x0
1 , x0 2 [ 1; 1], (satisfying the assumptions on respec-
tively assimilation and contrast perceptions) such that Candidate i cannot defeat
the median.
4.2 Winning Strategies
Our rst observation is that Candidate i does not have a winning strategy if the
set of voters who like him (L 1i (f1g)) is not a strict majority. Because in that case
Candidate j can always get at least a tie by announcing the midpoint of Candidate
is position. So winning strategies can only exist if at least one candidate is liked by
a strict majority of voters. Here we will only consider the case where one candidate
(Candidate 1) is not disliked by any voters and liked by a strict majority and the
other candidate (Candidate 2) is not liked by any voters. Thus we have
L1(x)  0 for all x 2 R;
Z
L 1i (f1g)
v(x)dx >
1
2
;
and
L2(x)  0 for all x 2 R:
Assuming that Candidate 2 is not liked by any voters means that checking if some
position of Candidate 1 is a winning strategy becomes a lot simpler. Because in
that case we only need to check if Candidate 2 can get at least a tie against it by
taking a certain position.
We will make some additional assumptions on voter utility functions and as-
similation perceptions. We assume that voter utility functions are of the form
u0(x) =  jxj for some  > 1:
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With respect to assimilation perceptions we loosely speaking assume that if two
voters have preferred points that are close then their assimilation perceptions are
also close. More precisely we assume that for any sequence (xn)n2N in [ 1; 1] and
any continuous function f on [ 1; 1],
xn ! x0 )
Z 1
 1
f(x)dF xn1 (x)!
Z 1
 1
f(x)dF x01 (x):
The following result gives conditions for existence and non-existence of winning
strategies for Candidate 1. Remember that E11 denotes the expected value of F
1
1 .
Theorem 4.4 With the additional assumptions from this subsection the following
two statements hold.
1. Suppose there exists a  > 0 such that
( ; )  L 11 (f1g)
and Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) > ux0(E
1
1) for all   1  x0  0:
Then there exists an a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0, [ a; a] is a winning
strategy for Candidate 1.
2. Suppose
ux0(E
1
1) >
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) for all 0 < x0 < 1:
Then Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy. More specically, if
Candidate 1 announces the ambiguous position [A a;A+a] then Candidate
2 can get at least a tie by announcing
A  aE11 if A  0
and
A+ aE11 if A < 0:
(And if Candidate 1 announces a certain position then Candidate 2 can get
at least a draw by announcing the median.)
The rst condition in the rst statement says that Candidate 1 is liked by all
voters in some neighborhood of the median. The second condition says that if a
voter with x0 2 [ 1; 0] likes Candidate 1 then he strictly prefers [ 1; 1] announced
by Candidate 1 over the certain position E11 . In the second statement the condition
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says that any voter with x0 > 0 strictly prefers E11 over [ 1; 1] announced by
Candidate 1.
The following lemma makes it easier to check for non-existence of winning
strategies when some additional assumptions on assimilation perceptions are sat-
ised.
Lemma 4.5 Suppose that, for all 0 < x0 < 1 and x > 0,
lim
y!x 
F 01 (y)  F 01 ( x)  lim
y!x 
F x01 (x0 + y)  F x01 (x0   x):
Furthermore suppose that
Ex01  E11 for all 0 < x0 < 1:
Then the condition in part 2. of Theorem 4.4 is satised ifZ 1
 1
u0(x)dF
0
1 (x)  u0(E11):
The new condition on the F x01 s says that, for any x > 0, F
0
1 puts at least as
much probability mass on ( x; x) as F x01 puts on (x0   x; x0 + x). It implies that
the perceived expected utility of [ 1; 1] for a voter at 0 with perception F 01 is at
least as high as that for a voter at x0 with perception F
x0
1 . The second condition
says that the mean of the assimilation perception of [ 1; 1] for voter a with x0 < 1
is not higher than that for a voter with x0  1.
We will now use our results to analyze cases where assimilation perceptions are
given by the two examples presented earlier.
4.2.1 Example 1
With this type of assimilation we have
E11 = (1  )
Z 1
 1
xdx+  = :
It is straightforward to show that the additional assumptions from this subsection
and the assumptions in Lemma 4.5 are satised. Thus we see that Candidate 1
does not have a winning strategy if
1  
2
Z 1
 1
 jxjdx+ ( j0j)   jj:
By straightforward calculations this inequality can be reduced to
 +
   1
1 + 
 0:
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For any  > 1 the expression on the left hand side is negative for  = 0, positive for
 = 1 and di¤erentiable (w.r.t. ) on [0; 1] with positive derivative. Therefore there
exists a () 2 (0; 1) such that Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy if
  (). We can calculate (2) explicitly by solving a second order equation.
We get
(2) =
p
13  1
6
 :43:
Our general results does not directly allow us to conclude that Candidate 1
has winning strategies if  > (). But we will now show that this is in fact the
case (assuming that Candidate 1 is liked by all voters in some neighborhood of the
median). For each  1  x0  0 there exists a unique Cx0 > x0 such thatZ 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) = ux0(C
x0):
(I.e. for a voter at x0, Cx0 is the certainty equivalent of F
x0
1 to the right of x0).
Lemma 4.6 For each  1  x0  0 we have Cx0  C0.
It follows from the lemma thatZ 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) = ux0(C
x0)  ux0(C0) for all   1  x0  0:
Since  > () we have u0(C0)  u0(E11) and thus C0 < E11 . Therefore we have
ux0(C
0) > ux0(E
1
1) for all   1  x0  0:
And then we can use Theorem 4.4 to conlude that Candidate 1 has winning strate-
gies.
4.2.2 Example 2
With this type of assimilation we have
E11 =
Z 1
 1
xf 11 (x)dx
=
1  
2
Z   1
2
 1
xdx+
1 + 
2
Z 1
2
  1
2
xdx+
1  
2
Z 1
1
2
xdx
=

2
:
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Again it is straightforward to show that the additional assumptions from this
subsection and the assumptions in Lemma 4.5 are satised. Thus we see that
Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy if
1  
2
Z   1
2
 1
 jxjdx+ 1 + 
2
Z 1
2
  1
2
 jxjdx+ 1  
2
Z 1
1
2
 jxjdx   j
2
j:
By straightforward calculations this inequality can be reduced to
(

2
) +

1 + 
(1  (1
2
))  1
1 + 
 0:
For any  > 1 the expression on the left hand side is negative for  = 0, positive
for  = 1 and di¤erentiable (w.r.t. ) on [0; 1] with positive derivative. Therefore
there exists a () 2 (0; 1) such that Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy
if   (). We can calculate (2) explicitly by solving a second order equation.
We get
(2) =
p
57  3
6
 :76:
Our general results does not directly allow us to conclude that Candidate 1
has winning strategies if  > (). But we will now show that this is in fact the
case (assuming that Candidate 1 is liked by all voters in some neighborhood of the
median). As in Example 1 it su¢ ces to show that Cx0  C0 for all  1  x0  0.
That follows from the two lemmas below.
Lemma 4.7 Cx0  C0 for all  1
2
 x0  0.
Lemma 4.8 Cx0  C  12 for all  1  x0   12 .
4.3 Nash Equilibria
4.3.1 Pure Strategies
Here we will make some observations about the existence and properties of pure
strategy Nash equilibria.
First, consider the case where neither candidate can defeat the median. Then
(s1; s

2) = (0; 0), i.e. convergence to the median, is an equilibrium because neither
candidate can win the election by deviating to another position. Furthermore,
if neither of the candidates are liked by exactly 50% of the voters then (0; 0)
is the unique equilibrium (each candidate can then defeat any position di¤erent
from the median). Thus the median voter theorem holds in this situation. If a
candidate is liked by exactly 50% of the voters (and thus disliked by the other 50%
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- otherwise he could defeat the median) then there could exist equilibria where he
is ambiguous. But the outcome would always be a tie and he could also get a tie
by deviating to the median.
Secondly, consider the case where one candidate (Candidate 1) can defeat the
median but the other (Candidate 2) cannot. If Candidate 2 is liked by strictly
less than 50% of the voters then Candidate 1 can defeat any position of Candidate
2. Therefore we have that in any equilibrium Candidate 1 must win the election.
Thus (s1; s

2) is an equilibrium if and only if s

1 is a winning strategy for Candidate
1 (which must be ambiguous). So we have existence of Nash equilibria if and only
if we have existence of winning strategies for Candidate 1. If Candidate 2 is liked
by exactly 50% of the voters then the equilibrium outcome is a tie if Candidate
2 has a position that gives him at least a tie against any position of Candidate
1. If Candidate 2 does not have such a position then we again have that in any
equilibrium Candidate 1 must win the election. In both situations it follows that
in any equilibrium at least one candidate will be ambiguous.
Finally, consider the case where both candidates can defeat the median. With-
out loss of generality assume that Candidate 1 is liked by at least as many voters
as Candidate 2. If Candidate 2 is liked by strictly less than 50% of the voters then
we have that (s1; s

2) is an equilibrium if and only if s

1 is a winning strategy for
Candidate 1 (Candidate 1 can defeat any position of Candidate 2). If Candidate
2 is liked by at least 50% of the voters then consider the numbers
Pi =
Z
fxjLi(x)>Lj(x)g
v(x)dx; i = 1; 2; j 6= i:
Pi is the share of voters who has a more positive attitude towards Candidate i
than towards Candidate j. If Pi > Pj then Candidate i can defeat any position
of Candidate j by imitation. Thus it follows that (s1; s

2) is an equilibrium if and
only if si is a winning strategy for Candidate i. If Pi = Pj then each candidate can
get a tie against any position of the other candidate (again by imitation). Thus
any equilibrium outcome must be a tie and both candidates must be ambiguous
in equilibrium.
4.3.2 Mixed Strategies
We have just seen that when at least one candidate can defeat the median, then,
except perhaps for some very special cases, pure strategy Nash equilibria only exist
if one candidate has a winning strategy. And we know from earlier that winning
strategies do not always exist even in the extreme case where one candidate is liked
by all voters and the other candidate is disliked by all voters. So it is natural to
ask the question if mixed strategy equilibria exist when pure strategy equilibria
do not.
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Consider again the model with the extra assumptions from the subsection on
winning strategies. The question then is if there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium
when Candidate 1 does not have a winning strategy. The result below shows
that when the condition for non-existence of winning strategies in Theorem 4.4 is
satised then the answer is no (except perhaps in a knife edge case).
Theorem 4.9 Suppose all the assumptions from the subsection on winning strate-
gies are satised. If
ux0(E
1
1) >
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) for all 0  x0 < 1
then there does not exist a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
With respect to our examples of assimilation, the theorem implies that if
 < () (in Example 1) or  < () (in Example 2) then a mixed strategy
equilibrium does not exist.
5 Discussion
Our goal in this paper has been to theoretically investigate if positive projection
(assimilation) of policy positions can explain why some politicians are ambiguous
with respect to their issue positions. To do that we have extended the standard
Downsian model of electoral competition by allowing candidates to take ambiguous
policy positions and by introducing projection e¤ects in votersperceptions of such
positions. By assuming that voters dislike ambiguity per se (if attitudes are neutral
then voters dislike ambiguity because of risk aversion) we have made sure that
projection is the driving force behind any result predicting ambiguity.
In the standard model the median defeats any other position. Therefore a
natural rst step was to nd out under which conditions a candidate can defeat
the median by being ambiguous. We presented necessary and su¢ cient conditions.
We saw that it may su¢ ce for a candidate to be liked by only a small group of
voters as long as he is not disliked by too many. For example, if a candidate is not
disliked by any voters then he can defeat the median if he is liked by an arbitrarily
small group of voters.
While having at least one candidate that is able to defeat the median by being
ambiguous is certainly a necessary condition for predicting ambiguity it is far from
su¢ cient. Electoral competition is a strategic situation and there is no reason
to assume that one candidate will announce the median if he can do better by
taking a di¤erent position. Therefore our next step was to look at existence and
non-existence of winning strategies (which must be ambiguous). We restricted
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attention to the case where one candidate is not liked by any voters and made some
additional assumptions on voter utility functions and perceptions. We saw that if
the assimilation e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong then a candidate who is not disliked
by any voters and liked by a strict majority has winning strategies. But even if
he is liked by all voters he may not have winning strategies. So our model does
predict that a generally liked candidate will be ambiguous if he is running against
a candidate who is generally not liked and the assimilation e¤ect is su¢ ciently
strong. But even a candidate with the largest possible advantage due to voters
non-policy related attitudes may not have a position that wins the election for him
(if the assimilation e¤ect is not strong enough). That is a rather striking result.
While the possible non-existence of winning strategies even for a candidate with
the largest possible advantage due to votersattitudes is an interesting feature of
the model it is also problematic. Because, as our observations on Nash equilibria
revealed, when at least one candidate can defeat the median then non-existence of
winning strategies implies non-existence of pure strategy equilibria (except perhaps
in some very special cases). So when the median voter theorem breaks down but
neither candidate has a winning strategy then our model does not give us clear
predictions in terms of pure strategy equilibria. And we have also seen that turning
attention to mixed strategy equilibria is not a solution to this problem. So an
obvious direction for further research is to come up with a model that give better
equilibrium predictions.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
For each n 2 N let
Xni = fxjLi(x) = 1;
1
n
 jxj  ng:
Since a strict majority of voters likes Candidate i there exists an N 2 N such that
XNi contains the preferred points of a strict majority of voters. We will prove that
there exists an a0 > 0 such that, for any 0 < a  a0, all voters with x0 2 XNi
strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate i over the median (x = 0).
For each a > 0,
max
 aya
ju00x0(y)j
is a continuous function of x0 on (a;1). So for a < 1N it follows by compactness
that the function is bounded on [ 1
N
; N ]. Thus we can dene
Ca = max
1
N
x0N
max
 aya
ju00x0(y)j:
Now let 1
N
 x0  N , 0 < a < 1N and x 2 [ a; a]. Then, by Taylors theorem,
we have
ux0(x) = ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)x+
u00x0()
2
x2:
for some  2 [ a; a] (actually between 0 and x). And thus it follows that
ux0(x)  ux0(0) + u0x0(0)x 
Ca
2
x2:
Using this inequality we get (E11 denotes the expected value of F
1
1 )Z a
 a
ux0(x)dF
a
a (x) 
Z a
 a
(ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)x  Ca
2
x2)dF aa (x)
= ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)
Z a
 a
xdF aa (x) 
Ca
2
Z a
 a
x2dF aa (x)
= ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)aE11  
Ca
2
Z a
 a
x2dF aa (x)
 ux0(0) + u0x0(0)aE11  
Ca
2
a2
Z a
 a
dF aa (x)
= ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)aE11  
Ca
2
a2
 ux0(0) + u00( 
1
N
)aE11  
Ca
2
a2:
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Since u00(  1N ) > 0, E11 > 0 and Ca is decreasing with a it follows that, for a
su¢ ciently small,Z a
 a
ux0(x)dF
a
a (x) > ux0(0) for all
1
N
 x0  N
So all voters with 1
N
 x0  N and Li(x0) = 1 strictly prefer [ a; a] announced
by Candidate i over the median for a su¢ ciently small. By symmetry the same
holds for voters with  N  x0    1N and Li(x0) = 1. Thus it holds for all voters
with x0 2 XNi . 2
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
Let A 2 (0; E11). Pick an N 2 N such that a majority of voters have preferred
points in
XN+i = fxjx 2 X+i ;
1
N
 jxj  Ng:
For a > 0 with aA+ a < 1
N
we can dene
CA;a = max
1
N
jx0jN
max
aA ayaA+a
ju00x0(y)j:
Then, by Taylors theorem, we get that for all x0 with 1N  jx0j  N and all a > 0
with aA+ a < 1
N
,
ux0(x)  ux0(0) + u0x0(0)x 
CA;a
2
x2 for all x 2 [aA  a; aA+ a]:
For all voters with x0 2 X+i , 1N  x0  N the perceived expected utility of
[aA  a; aA+ a] is at least
1
2a
Z aA+a
aA a
ux0(x)dx:
Using the inequality above we get that, for all a > 0 with aA+ a < 1
N
,
1
2a
Z aA+a
aA a
ux0(x)dx 
Z aA+a
aA a
(ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)x  CA;a
2
x2)dx
= ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)aA  CA;a
2
Z aA+a
aA a
x2dx
 ux0(0) + u0x0(0)aA 
CA;a
2
(aA+ a)2
 ux0(0) + u00( 
1
N
)Aa  CA;a
2
(1 + A)2a2:
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The last expression is strictly greater than ux0(0) for small a > 0. So it follows
that for a su¢ ciently small all voters with x0 2 X+i , 1N  x0  N strictly prefer
[aA  a; aA+ a] over the median.
For all voters with x0 2 X+i ,  N  x0    1N the perceived expected utility of
[aA  a; aA+ a] (with   1
N
< aA  a) isZ aA+a
aA a
ux0(x)dF
aA a
aA;a (x):
Using the "Taylor inequality" from above we get that, for all a > 0 with
aA+ a < 1
N
,Z aA+a
aA a
ux0(x)dF
aA a
aA;a (x) 
Z aA+a
aA a
(ux0(0) + u
0
x0
(0)x  CA;a
2
x2)dF aA aaA;a (x)
 ux0(0) + u0x0(0)(aA  aE11) 
CA;a
2
(aA+ a)2
 ux0(0) + u00(
1
N
)(A  E11)a 
CA;a
2
(1 + A)2a2:
The last expression is is strictly greater than ux0(0) for small a > 0. So it follows
that for a su¢ ciently small all voters with x0 2 X+i ,  N  x0    1N strictly
prefer [aA  a; aA+ a] over the median.
Thus we have seen that for a > 0 su¢ ciently small, all voters with x0 2 XN+i
(a majority) prefer [aA  a; aA+ a] over the median. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.3.
Suppose that assimilation perceptions are as in Example 1 (for some 0 <  < 1).
Let contrast perceptions be given by
Gx01 =

F 11 if x0 2 [ 1; 0)
F 11 if x0 2 [0; 1]

:
Suppose Candidate i announces some interval. We will show that at least 50% of
the voters strictly prefer the median over the interval.
The interval can be written as
[aA  a; aA+ a] for some A 2 R; a > 0:
For A = 0 all voters with Li(x0)  0 (at least 50%) strictly prefer the median (by
risk aversion).
For A  E11 it is easily seen that
E(F x0aA;a)  aA  aE11  0 for all x0 2 [aA  a; aA+ a]:
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And then it follows by risk aversion that all voters with x0  0 strictly prefer the
median over the interval. Analogously it follows that if A   E11 then all voters
with x0  0 prefer strictly the median over the interval.
Thus the only cases left are A 2 (0; E11) and A 2 ( E11 ; 0). Suppose A 2
(0; E11). Then it is straightforward to check that for each voter with
x0 2 fx  0jLi(x) =  1g [ fx < 0jLi(x)  0g
the mean of the voters perception of the interval is further away from x0 than the
median (0). Thus all these voters strictly prefer the median over the interval (by
risk aversion). Since the set above is the complement of X+i these voters constitute
at least a weak majority. If A 2 ( E11 ; 0) then it follows analogously that all voters
with x0 =2 X i strictly prefer the median over the interval. Again that is at least a
weak majority. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.4.
1. First we show that Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x)
is a continuous function of x0 on [ 1; 1]. Let x0 2 [ 1; 1] and et (xn) be a sequence
in [ 1; 1] such that xn ! x0. Then we have
j
Z 1
 1
uxn(x)dF
xn
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x)j
 j
Z 1
 1
uxn(x)dF
xn
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
xn
1 (x)j
+j
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
xn
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x)j
 max
x2[ 1;1]
juxn(x)  ux0(x)j
+j
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
xn
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x)j:
The rst term in the last expression converges to zero because of the continuity of
u0 and the compactness of [ 1; 1]. The second term converges to zero by the con-
tinuity assumption on the F x01 s. That proves the continuity of
R 1
 1 ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x).
Then we can nd a 0 < C < E11 and an " > 0 such thatZ 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) > ux0(C) for all x0 2 [ 1; "]:
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The following two claims nishes the proof of the rst part of the theorem.
Claim A: For su¢ ciently small a > 0, [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1
defeats any y 2 ( aC; aC) announced by Candidate 2.
Proof: Choose an N 2 N such that a strict majority of voters have preferred
points in the set
XN1 = fxjL1(x) = 1;
1
N
 jxj  Ng:
It su¢ ces to show that for a su¢ ciently small all voters with x0 2 XN1 , x0 > 0
will prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 over aC announced by Candidate 2.
Since 0 < C < E11 that follows by Taylors theorem as in earlier proofs.
Claim B: For su¢ ciently small a > 0, [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1
defeats any y =2 ( aC; aC) announced by Candidate 2.
Proof: Let a < . From the homogeneity (of degree ) of u0 and what we have
shown above it follows that for any x0 2 [ a; a"],Z a
 a
ux0(x)dF
x0
a (x) =
Z 1
 1
ux0(ax)dF
x0
1 (ax) = a

Z 1
 1
ux0
a
(x)dF
x0
a
1 (x)
> aux0
a
(C) = ux0(aC):
Thus we see that all voters with x0 2 [ a; a"] strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by
Candidate 1 over any certain position y  aC.
Voters with x0 2 ( ; a) has the same perception of [ a; a] announced by
Candidate 1 as voters with x0 =  a. And they are less (absolute) risk-averse on
[ a; a]. Therefore these voters also prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 over
any y  aC.
By Taylors theorem it is easily seen that voters with x0 =   and a neutral
attitude towards Candidate 1 strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 over
any y  aC when a is small enough. The same is true for voters with x0 <  
because they are less risk averse on [ a; a].
Thus all voters with x0  a" strictly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 to
any y  aC for a su¢ ciently small. By symmetry it follows that, for a su¢ ciently
small, all voters with x0   a" stricly prefer [ a; a] announced by Candidate 1 to
any y   aC. That ends the proof of the claim.
2. Suppose Candidate 1 announces [A   a;A + a] for some A  0 (if A < 0
the proof is analogous). Then, by the homogeneity of u0 and the condition in the
statement, we have that all voters with x0 2 (A   a;A) strictly prefer A   aE11
announced by Candidate 2 over the interval announced by Candidate 1. By risk
aversion the same is true for voters with x0  A a. Thus at least 50% of the vot-
ers strictly prefer A  aE11 announced by Candidate 2 over the interval announced
by Candidate 1. 2
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Proof of Lemma 4.5.
Suppose Z 1
 1
u0(x)dF
0
1 (x)  u0(E11):
By the rst assumption in the lemma it follows that, for all 0 < x0 < 1,Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
u0(x)dF
0
1 (x):
Therefore we have that, for all x0 2 (0; E11 ],Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) 
Z 1
 1
u0(x)dF
0
1 (x)  u0(E11) < ux0(E11):
For x0 2 (E11 ; 1) it follows from the second assumption in the lemma that E11
is (weakly) closer to x0 than E
x0
1 . So by risk aversion it follows that, for all
x0 2 (E11 ; 1), Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dF
x0
1 (x) < ux0(E
x0
1 )  ux0(E11):
Thus the condition in part 2. of Theorem 4.4 is satised. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.6.
For each x0 2 [ 1; 0] let Cx0U > x0 be dened by
1
2
Z 1
 1
ux0(x)dx = ux0(C
x0
U ):
If Cx0U  C0U then we have
ux0(0) + (1  )ux0(C0U)  ux0(x0) + (1  )ux0(Cx0U ) = ux0(Cx0):
So the certainty equivalent (the one to the right of the preferred point) of the
lottery "0 with probability , C0U with probability 1   " for a voter at x0 is
greater than or equal to Cx0. The certainty equivalent of the same lottery for a
voter at 0 is C0. And since voters at x0 are less absolute risk averse on [0; C0U ]
than voters at 0 the certainty equivalent for a voter at 0 is greater than that for a
voter at x0. Thus we must have Cx0  C0. So we see that it su¢ ces to show that
Cx0U  C0U for all x0 2 [ 1; 0).
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Let x0 2 [ 1; 0). Dene Cx0U ; Cx0U+ > x0 and C0U ; C0U+ > 0 by
1
2 + x0
Z x0+1
 1
ux0(x)dx = ux0(C
x0
U );
1
 x0
Z 1
x0+1
ux0(x)dx = ux0(C
x0
U+)
and
1
2 + x0
Z x0+1
 1
u0(x)dx = u0(C
0
U );
1
 x0
Z 1
x0+1
u0(x)dx = u0(C
0
U+):
It is easily seen that
Cx0U   C0U  and Cx0U+  C0U+:
Thus we have that
2 + x0
2
ux0(C
0
U ) +
 x0
2
ux0(C
0
U+) 
2 + x0
2
ux0(C
x0
U ) +
 x0
2
ux0(C
x0
U+) = ux0(C
x0
U ):
So the certainty equivalent (the one to the right of the preferred point) of the
lottery "C0U  with probability
2+x0
2
, C0U+ with probability
 x0
2
" for a voter at x0
is greater than or equal to Cx0U . The certainty equivalent of the same lottery for a
voter at 0 is C0U . And since voters at x0 are less absolute risk averse on [C
0
U ; C
0
U+]
than voters at 0 the certainty equivalent for a voter at 0 is greater than that for a
voter at x0. Thus we must have C
x0
U  C0U . 2
Proof of Lemma 4.7.
For each x0 2 [ 1; 0] let Cx0U > x0 be dened an in the proof of lemma 4.6.
Furthermore let 0 < D0 < C0U be dened byZ 1
2
  1
2
u0(x)dx = u0(D
0):
From the proof of Lemma 4.6 we know thatCx0U  C0U for all x0 2 [ 1; 0]. Therefore
we have, for each x0 2 [ 12 ; 0],
ux0(D
0) + (1  )ux0(C0U)  
Z x0+ 12
x0  12
ux0(x)dx+ (1  )ux0(Cx0U ) = ux0(Cx0):
So the certainty equivalent (the one to the right of the preferred point) of the lot-
tery "0 with probability , C0U with probability 1  " for a voter at x0 is greater
than or equal to Cx0. The certainty of the same lottery for a voter at 0 is C0. And
since voters at x0 are less risk averse on [D0; C0U ] than voters at 0 the certainty
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equivalent for a voter at 0 is greater than that for a voter at x0. Thus we must
have Cx0  C0. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.8.
For each x0 2 [ 1; 12 ] the assimilation perception of [ 1; 1] is a convex com-
bination of the uniform distribution on [ 1; 0] and the uniform distribution on
[ 1; 1]. Let Cx0U be dened as in the proof of lemma 4.6. Furthermore let Dx0 > x0
be dened by Z 0
 1
ux0(x)dx = ux0(D
x0):
Mimicking arguments from the proof of Lemma 4.6 it follows that Cx0U  C
  1
2
U and
Dx0  D  12 for all x0 2 [ 1; 12 ] . Therefore we have that for each x0 2 [ 1; 12 ] ,
ux0(D
  1
2 ) + (1  )ux0(C 
1
2
U )  ux0(Dx0) + (1  )ux0(Cx0U ) = ux0(Cx0):
And since a voter at x0 <  12 is less risk averse than a voter at  12 on [D 
1
2 ; C
  1
2
U ]
it follows that Cx0  C  12 for all x0 2 [ 1; 12 ] (same argument as in the two
previous proofs). 2
Proof of Theorem 4.9.
Suppose (1;2) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We will show that this
leads to a contradiction.
Let " > 0. Then there exists a0 > 0 such that 2 puts less than " probability
mass on the certain positions in ( a0; a0) n f0g. Therefore, by announcing the
ambiguous position [ a; a] for a su¢ ciently close to zero Candidate 1 can defeat
2 with probability greater than 1   " (Candidate 1 defeats all certain positions
not in ( a0; a0) n f0g). Thus it follows that in the equilibrium (1;2), Candidate
1 must win with probability one.
Pick A 2 R, a > 0 such that, for any neighborhood B of ( A; a), 1 puts
positive probability on
f[A  a;A+ a]j(A; a) 2 Bg:
The following claim shows that for some B Candidate 2 has a position that defeats
all positions in the set above. Thus it follows that in the equilibrium (1;2),
Candidate 2 must win with some positive probability. That is a contradiction.
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Claim: Suppose Candidate 2 announces
A+ aE11 if A  0
A  aE11 if A > 0

:
Then there exists some neighborhood B of ( A; a) such that he defeats all positions
of Candidate 1 in the set
f[A  a;A+ a]j(A; a) 2 Bg:
Proof: We will only do the proof for A  0, the other case is completely
analogous. By announcing A+aE11 Candidate 2 defeats [ A a; A+a] (by Theorem
4.4, part 2.). We have to show that he also defeats "nearby" ambiguous positions.
Suppose not. Then there exists a sequence (An; an) that converges to ( A; a) and
satises that, for any n, [An an; An+an] announced by Candidate 1 gets at least
a tie against A+aE11 announced by Candidate 2. Therefore, there must exist x0s
such that Z
ux0(x)dF
x0
An;an
(x)9
Z
ux0(x)dF
x0
A;a
(x):
(If x0 < An   an then F x0An;an means FAn anAn;an and so on). By using the denitions
of F x0An;an and F
x0
A;a
and the continuity assumption on the F x01 s in the section on
winning strategies it follows that there is convergence for all x0s. Thus we have a
contradiction. 2
32
